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the. presence of such a clause, there can be no contest of the
charitable gift since the parent or issue will necessarily fail to satisfy
the statutory requirement that "he . . .receive a pecuniar) benefit
from a successful contest . . . ."135 Moreover, section 5-3.3 in no

way restricts a testator's ability to bequeath half of his estate to
charity and half to a total stranger, thus leaving penniless those
dependents whom the law requires he support during his
lifetime.1 3 6 Concededly, the overruling of the unfortunate holding
in Cairo would not remedy all of these problems. It would be a first
step, however, toward preventing the circumvention of the clear
legislative policy, underlying section 5-3.3.
Editor's Note. As The Survey goes to print, Eckart has been reversed
on appeal, 175 N.Y.L.J. 91, May 11, 1976, at 4, col. 1 (Ct. App.).
Although the Court of Appeals did reject the Cairo rationale, it
considered itself compelled to reaffirm the Cairo result. The Court
declared that "it is the statute itself

. .

which disrupts the stated

legislative purpose. . . . [and] [i]f there is to be a constructive
change it should come from the Legislature." Id., col. 4.
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Lait § 671(4): Use of an interrogatory to determine qualification
under no-fault's threshold "serious injury" test.
New York's enactment of the Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act,1 37 popularly known as the no-fault insurEstate of Fitzgerald, 72 Misc. 2d 472, 339 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972),
provided that should there be a 5-3.3 contest to the bequest made therein to the Archdiocese
of New York, the gift should pass personally to the Archbishop of New York without
limitation or restriction on its use. The court held that "a clause providing for an alternative
disposition ... may deprive a parent or issue... of any status to contest under EPTL 5-3.3."
Id. at 475, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337. One proposal to close this loophole advocates ignoring the
alternative provisions of the will for the purpose of allowing those persons who would
otherwise participate in the distribution of the excess to contest the will. See COXIMISSION ON
ESTATES, supra note 100, at 228.
For a discussion of the possibility that, in addition to the gift-over loophole, the policy of
the statute may also be circumvented by an inter vivos gift, in trust or otherwise, for
charitable purposes, see 17B McKINNEY'S EPTL § 5-3.3, commentary at 782 (1967). The
various types of inter vivos dispositions that may be -employed are outlined in Fisch, Restrictions on Charitable Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F. 307, 331 (1964).
135 EPTL § 5-3.3(a)(1).
,3 Surrogate Midonick, in In re Estate of Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), proposed that the surrogate have the power to impose
temporary and reasonable support obligations on all solvent estates until young dependents
reach the age of majority or are able to provide for themselves. In the alternative, he
suggested that the legislature could enact a formula to impose a trust on an estate until the
children come of age. Id. at 78-79, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71.
137 Ch. 13, § 1, [1973] N.Y. Laws 56 (codified at N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney
Supp. 1975)).
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ance law, has engendered criticism on an array of constitutional
grounds.1 38 The Court of Appeals' recent decision upholding the
constitutionality of the Act, 13 9 however, clearly indicates that nofault insurance is here to stay. No-fault advocates have long maintained that the traditional tort action both "placed an inordinate
strain on . . . court systems and judicial resources"1 40 and was
overly expensive. 4 I The major purpose of New York's no-fault law
was to remedy these problems.1 42 The statute provides that if both
parties are "covered"' 1 43 access to the courts for recovery of
"noneconomic loss," i.e. pain and suffering, 144 is limited to those
' 14 5
plaintiffs suffering a "serious injury."
Nevertheless, substantial procedural problems often develop in
the day-to-day operation of the no-fault statute, at times frustrating
,38N.Y. INS. LAW § 673(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975), seriously restricts the common law
right to maintain a tort action for noneconomic loss, see note 145 infra, and has been attacked
as violative of equal protection. E.g., Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59-66, 340
N.E.2d 444, 455-60, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 16-22 (1975); Note, No-Fault Insurance in New York:
Another Hazardfor the Innocent Driver, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 689, 709-11 (1974). It has also
been argued that the reform represented by the no-fault scheme is unreasonably related to
the legislatively perceived defects of the traditional tort system and therefore constitutes an
infringement on the due process rights of accident victims. Montgomery v. Daniels, supra at
54-56, 340 N.E.2d at 452-53, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of
the constitutional issues see Hart, The Constitutionality of the New York State Comprehensive
Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 379 (1974).
139Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, rev'g 81
Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975). The Court, employing the
traditional rational basis test, found the no-fault statute to be in conformity with the equal
protection guarantees of the Federal and New York Constitutions. 38 N.Y.2d at 59-66, 340
N.E.2d at 455-60, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 16-22. Addressing the due process argument, the Court
also ruled that the legislation "is reasonably related to the promotion of the public welfare
and thus represents a legitimate exercise of our State's police power." Id. at 56, 340 N.E.2d
at 453, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
140 Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 51, 340 N.E.2d 444, 450, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9
(1975). Similar arguments were propounded by other commentators. E.g., R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 13-15 (1965); STATE OF NEW YORK
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . .. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 21-22 (1970).
141 Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 50, 340 N.E.2d 444, 449, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8
(1975); see Sullivan v. Darling, 81 Misc. 2d 817, 820, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (Sup. Ct.
Saratoga County 1975).
142 Governor's Memorandum, Feb. 13, 1973, as appearing in [1973] N.Y. Laws 2335
(McKinney), on approving Ch. 13 [1973] N.Y. Laws 56. See Comment, Nen, York Adopts
No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 662, 671 (1973).
143 A covered person is defined as "any pedestrian injured through the use or operation
of, or any owner, operator or occupant of, a motor vehicle which has in effect the financial
security required by [no-fault] ...." N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(10) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
'44The Act defines noneconomic loss as "pain and suffering and similar non-monetary
detriment." Id. § 671(3).
145 Id. § 673(1). The serious injury threshold can be crossed in two ways. An injury
resulting in death, significant disfigurement, or permanent loss of use or function qualifies as
a serious injury. Id. § 6 7 1(4)(a). Alternatively, an injury is deemed serious if the reasonable,
customary, and necessary expenses for medical or other statutorily enumerated related
services exceed $500. Id. § 671(4)(b). For a compilation of the residuary situations in which a
traditional tort action is available, see Comment, New York Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and
Analysis, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 662, 702-04 (1973).
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effectuation of the Act's major policy aims. 4 6 Indicative of this
potential procedural subversion of no-fault objectives is Cole v.
Berkowitz.' 47 In Cole, the New York City Civil Court, New York
County, granted defendant's motion to vacate a general verdict in
favor of plaintiff and dismiss the complaint because of the jury's
finding in response to an interrogatory that the serious injury
48
threshold had not been crossed.1
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by defendant's motor vehicle. He sustained injuries which prevented him from pursuing his
duties as a postal employee.14 9 At a plenary trial, plaintiff at146 See Schwartz, No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of Threshold Questions Under the New York
Statute -The Neglected Procedural Dimension, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Schwartz].
147 83 Misc. 2d 359, 373 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y.C. Civ. CL N.Y. County 1975).
148Id. at 361, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
1'49At trial, plaintiff testified that he suffered a 4-weeks' salary loss of $905 which was
reimbursed out of sick pay. Although the Cole court dismissed plaintiff's action, his rights to
recover this sum through no-fault remedies were not thereby prejudiced. Id. at 361, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 784. The statutory liability of an insurer, denominated as "first party benefits,"
consists of "basic economic loss" with several enumerated deductions. N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1975). Basic economic loss includes, up to a total of $50,000 per person:
(1) reasonable and necessary medical expenses; (2) loss of earnings up to $1000 per month
for not more than 3 years from the date of the accident; and (3) all other reasonable and
necessary expenses, up to $25 per day for not more than 1 year from the date of the
accident. Id. § 671(1)(a)-(c). A no-fault insurer is permitted to deduct from first party
benefits, inter alia, amounts recoverable under state or federal social security or workmen's
compensation benefits. Id. § 671(2)(b). This provision, however, will presumably not aid the
insurer in a case involving New York State Workmen's Compensation, since such benefits are
not available if first party benefits are payable under no-fault insurance. Compare N.Y.
WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAW § 205(10) (McKinney Supp. 1975) with N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(2)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1975). In Cole, plaintiff, a federal employee, sustained his injury while
proceeding to his place of employment. As Judge Wallach noted, plaintiff's recovery of lost
earnings under the statute is therefore dependent upon the question of whether or not
reimbursed sick pay is a workmen's compensation benefit. 83 Misc. 2d at 361-62, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 784. It would appear that plaintiff's injury was not sustained "in the performance of his duty," 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1970), thereby precluding federal workmen's
compensation benefits. Cf Bailey v. United States, 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971). Moreover,
under federal law a distinction is implicitly drawn between sick leave and workmen's compensation benefits. An employee may elect to use accrued sick leave and therefore be
precluded from collecting workmen's compensation benefits until such use is terminated. 5
U.S.C. § 8118(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). Construing such an election as a workmen's compensation
benefit would appear tortuous. In addition, while receiving benefits an employee generally
may not receive salary. Id. § 8116(a); cf. Allen v. United States, 201 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1952)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 957 (1953) (accepting benefits exclusive remedy despite
contractual provision providing for salary continuation). Thus, contrapositive logic would
dictate that exercising a right to receive accrued sick pay, presumably secured by a collective
bargaining agreement, generally precludes federal workmen's compensation benefits.
Interestingly, the amount of plaintiff's salary loss should never have been disclosed to
the Cole jury. Basic economic loss may be offered in evidence only "to the extent that it is
relevant to the proof of noneconomic loss." N.Y. INS. LAw § 673(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
In Cole, the period of plaintiffs disability may have been probative of the issue of
noneconomic loss; the amount of wage decrement, however, was not. Moreover, it appears
that a "limited purpose" charge was proper. Such a charge must be requested, however, by
counsel. C.K.S. Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 218, 268
N.Y.S.2d 409 (Ist Dep't 1966) (per curiam); Pritchard v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 92
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tempted to prove that he had suffered a serious injury within the
meaning of the no-fault statute15 0 since he incurred necessary and
reasonable medical expenses in excess of $500.151 The jury, answering an interrogatory 152 submitted by Judge Wallach at defendant's request, 153 found that the serious injury threshold had not
been crossed since plaintiff's necessary and reasonable medical
expenses totaled only $472.
Concededly, if the threshold may be assessed negatively as a
matter of law, the parties may quickly and efficiently proceed to
no-fault remedies' 54 in consonance with the purposes of the Act.15 5
App. Div. 178, 185-86 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 364, 72 N.E. 243 (1904); 1 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 13, at 301 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Evidence Admissiblefor a Linited Purpose - The Risk
of Confusion Upsetting the Balance of Advantage, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 81, 90 (1964). Absent the
limiting charge, reimbursed salary loss is presumably recoverable under the "collateral
source" rule. See, e.g., Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777, 213 N.Y.S.2d 44
(1961). But cf. Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962)
(collateral source rule inapplicable to gratuities). Indeed, the jury in Cole was permitted,
"without objection," to consider the loss of earnings as an item of damages pursuant to this
rule. 83 Misc. 2d at 361, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 784. By defendant's failure to object, and thereby
force the plaintiff to pursue statutory remedies for the recovery of this sum, his no-fault
carrier was exposed to liability not imposed under the statute. The Act entitles the insurer to
deduct 20% of lost earnings from the computation of statutory liability for basic economic
loss. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Therefore, assuming the total wage
decrement was included in the jury's $1500 verdict, had the threshold been crossed, defendant's insurer would have incurred excess liability in the amount of $181, i.e., 20% of
$905.
l5o The plaintiff is required to state in the complaint that a serious injury has been
sustained. CPLR 3016(2). He may make the allegation without "evidentiary detail," 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 3016, commentary at 6 (Supp. 1975), but facts supporting the allegation
may be required in a bill of particulars. CPLR 3043(a)(6). A general denial is sufficient to
raise the threshold issue at trial. Morell v. Vargas, 83 Misc. 2d 30, 371 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. Queens County 1975). Generally, the party with the burden of pleading has the
burden of proof. W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 99 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). It is widely
presumed that this general rule is to be followed in no-fault cases. See Schwartz, supra note
10, at 47; 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3043, commentary at 40 (Supp. 1975).
15
, See note 145 supra.
152 The jury's general verdict may be accompanied by "written answers to written
interrogatories ... upon one or more issues of fact." CPLR 411 1(c). In Cole, Judge Wallach
referred to the jurors' collateral findings as a "special verdict." 83 Misc. 2d at 361, 373
N.Y.S.2d at 783. CPLR 4111, however, provides that "[t]he court may direct the jury to find
either a general verdict or a special verdict." Thus, the special verdict is used "in lieu of" the
general verdict, 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4111, commentary at 142 (1963), while "an answer to
an interrogatory is used in conjunction with a general verdict." Id. See generally 4 WK&M
4111.02-.04.
'5' It is within the court's discretion to require thejury to answer written interrogatories.
CPLR 4111 (c).
" See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 7 (Supp. 1975). In Davis v. Pathe
Cab Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 559, 377 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), the court
found as a matter of law that the $500 threshold had been crossed. Such a ruling, however,
would appear to be predicated on the underlying facts of the particular case. Compare id.
(allegations of 79-year old plaintiff with fractured humerus wholly unrefuted), with Snyder v.
Laffer, 81 Misc. 2d 814, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (court unable to
determine as matter of law if $1,180.75 is reasonable and customary expense for treatment
of fractured clavicle).
5' See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
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Such cases, however, will rarely be litigated. 156 If the issue approximates the borderline where reasonable men differ, submission to a
jury is proper upon demand by either party. 15 7 Assuming arguendo
that the threshold issue must be resolved at the main trial, utilizing
an interrogatory accompanying a general verdict is submitted to be
the least efficient approach. The jury will be required to deliberate
on at least two, and possibly three, separate issues: threshold qualification; defendant's liability; and, should the lacter be resolved
affirmatively, damages.1 58 Thus, using an interrogatory to assess
the facts underlying a plaintiff's allegation that he has sustained a
serious injury requires a full trial of all issues in an automobile
negligence action. A wasteful trial of moot issues will have occurred
where the jury's response to the interrogatory resolves' the
threshold issue in the defendant's favor. Expense, delay, and institutional strain are maximized by requiring resolution of a
statutorily created issue in the context of the traditional fault system.
Another plenary trial procedure used in no-fault cases has
been to charge the jury to proceed to the question of liability only
upon finding that threshold qualification has been met. 159 This
approach is somewhat more desirable in the setting of a full trial
since it eliminates unnecessary jury deliberation on the issues of
liability and damages.' 60 Potentially needless and prejudicial evidence pertaining to liability and damages, however, would still be
presented to the triers of fact.' 61 Perhaps a better solution, there15 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 7 (Supp. 1975).
157See Morell v. Vargas, 83 Misc. 2d 30, 371 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1975); Sullivan v. Darling, 81 Misc. 2d 817, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga
County 1975); Maynor v. Wrenn, 78 Misc. 2d 193, 356 N.Y.S.2d 469 (City Ct. of Syracuse
1974). See also Snyder v. Laffer, 81 Misc. 2d 814, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1975).
I" See, e.g., Cole v. Berkowitz, 83 Misc. 2d 359, 373 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975).
...
See, e.g., Morell v. Vargas, 83 Misc. 2d 30, 371 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1975); Maynor v. Wrenn, 78 Misc. 2d 193, 356 N.Y.S.2d 469 (City Ct. of Syracuse
1974) (dicta).
160Plaintiffs may prefer this particular avenue "on the theory that the total impact-ofthe-damage evidence would encourage favorable threshold assessments." Schwartz, supra
note 146, at 57. This theory is applicable to the interrogatory mechanism to a somewhat
lesser degree since the jury will pass on the issues of liability and damages in any event. In
fact, it did not hold true in Cole. There, the jurors returned a verdict awarding $1500 in
damages. Nevertheless, the threshold requirement was not reached because they also determined that only $472 was attributable to reasonable and necessary medical expenses. 83
Misc. 2d at 361, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
;61 Arguably, the interrogatory approach does not expressly enlighten the jurors as to
the existence of a threshold requirement, whereas the comprehensive charge does. It is
submitted this distinction is faulty in its assumption of jurzor naivet6. Moreover, both methods expose the jurors to possibly prejudicial evidence on the questions of liability and
damages.
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fore, would be the employment of a split trial.1 6 2 In addition to
promoting efficiency,1 63 a split trial precludes the possibility of
prejudice resulting from exposing the jurors to proof of damages
and liability prior to resolution of the threshold issue.
Alternatively, a defendant desirous of contesting a plaintiff's
threshold qualification may seek to discharge the entire case by
motion.16 4 Since the no-fault statute is virtually devoid of procedural guidelines, 16 5 extant procedural law must be consulted.
The most appropriate vehicles for such a disposition are the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action 1 66 and the
motion for summary judgment, 1 67 with the court in either case
ordering an immediate trial of the threshold issue. t6 8 Much can be
262

CPLR 603 provides in part: "In furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice the

court may ... order a separate trial ...

of any separate issue. The court may order the trial

of any . . . issue prior to the trial of the others." Professor Schwartz predicts a favorable
reception of this approach by the judiciary and practitioners. Schwartz, supra note 146, at 57.
163 See generally Ziesel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963).
64 See text accompanying notes 166-68 infra. Should the defendant raise threshold

qualification as a defense in the answer, a plaintiff interested in a prompt disposition may
move to strike the defense pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b). Davis v. Pathe Cab Corp., 84 Misc. 2d
559, 377 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211,
commentary at 10 (Supp. 1975). Issues raised on such a motion may be resolved by an
immediate trial. CPLR 3211 (c). See note 168 infra. See also Davis v. Pathe Cab Corp., supra
(motion to strike granted as a matter of law).
65
' See N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
166 CPLR 321 l(a)(7).
167 CPLR 3212. Professor Siegel has noted that the preferable method for raising the
threshold issue is the motion to dismiss under 3211(a)(7). Unlike a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212(a), which can be invoked only after the defendant serves
his answer, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is available any time.
CPLR 3211(e). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 10 (Supp. 1975). But see
Schwartz, supra note 146, at 55, wherein the author indicates that summary judgment will be
the preferred method. Moreover, the court may, after adequate notice to the parties, treat a
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. CPLR 3211(c).
16 CPLR 3211(c) provides in pertinent part:
Whether or not issue has been joined, the court, after adequate notice to the
parties, may treat [a] motion (under subdivision (a) or (b)] as a motion for summary
judgment. The court may, when appropriate for the expeditious disposition of the
controversy, order immediate trial of the issues raised on the motion.
Treating the motion as one for summary judgment and ordering an immediate trial are
"separate" powers. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 441 (1970). See Duboff v.
Board of Higher Educ., 34 App. Div. 2d 824, 312 N.Y.S.2d 726 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
Thus, to promote court efficiency and a possible early disposition, the court can order an
immediate adjudication of the threshold issue pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c). Sullivan v. Darling,
81 Misc. 2d 817, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1975) (dicta); 7B McKiNNEY'S
CPLR 3211, commentary at 8 (Supp. 1975).
With respect to the summary judgment motion, CPLR 3212(c) provides in part:
If it appears that the only triable issues of fact arising on a motion for summary
judgment relate to the amount or extent of damages, or if the motion is based on
any of the grounds enumerated in subdivision (a) or (b) of rule 3211, the court may,
when appropriate for the expeditious disposition of the controversy, order an
immediate trial of such issues of fact . ...
In Sullivan v. Darling, 81 Misc. 2d 817, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County
1975), the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for
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said for this method. An order favoring the plaintiff would serve to
promote settlement and narrow the issues for the main trial.' 69
Conversely, an unfavorable order would result in immediate dismissal. Moreover, disposition by motion would discourage "wasteful forays into the plenary litigative system"' 7 0 based on a mere
allegation of a serious injury.
Admittedly, employment of the motion procedure would
necessitate repetition of medical proof if the plaintiff's serious
injury allegation was upheld. Postponing resolution of the
threshold issue until the plenary trial clearly circumvents both the
necessity for a dual trial and the concomitant duplication of some
medical evidence.' 7 ' Refusal to determine this issue before plenary
trial on the merits, however, delays resolution of the threshold
issue, thereby obstructing any possibility of a relatively prompt
dismissal, and prevents unclogging of calendar congestion. 7 2 In
addition, retention by the courts of automobile negligence actions
with expanded issues may upset the actuarial basis of no-fault
insurance, resulting in higher premiums. 7 3 In short, immediate
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An immediate trial of the threshold issue was requested
pursuant to CPLR 3212(c). The motion was granted "insofar as it [sought] an immediate trial
.... Id. at 821, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 204. Although the plaintiff's injuries were the result of a
one-car accident, the opinion is silent on whether or not liability was conceded. Assuming it
was not, the court appears to have employed lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
CPLR 321 1(a)(2), as the predicate for an immediate trial. Analysis on a jurisdictional basis,
however, appears inconsistent with the wording of N.Y. INS. LAw § 673(i) (McKinney Supp.
1975), which provides in part: "[I]n any action by or on behalf of a covered person against
another covered person for personal injuries . . . there shall be no right of recovery for
non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for basic economic loss." Id.
(emphasis added). The no-fault law has been viewed as not withdrawing the courts' jurisdiction in minor injury cases, but rather as imposing a limitation on the right of recovery.
Snyder v. Laffer, 81 Misc. 2d 814, 816, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1975). It is submitted thatsuch an approach is overly literal and ignores the practical effect
of the statute in regard to noneconomic loss. See Schwartz, supra note 146, at 56. Furthermore, a contrary interpretation would permit the use of CPLR 321 I(a)(2), together with
3211(c),'as an alternative means of securing an immediate trial.
169 Sullivan v. Darling, 81 Misc. 2d 817, 820, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga
County 1975). Of course, the extent to which settlement is promoted will vary, depending
upon the issue of liability and the conceivable amount of damages.
170
Id. at 820, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 203, quoting Schwartz, supra note 146, at 53. It has been
suggested that raising the threshold from $500 to $2000 will aid in relieving calendar
congestion. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1976, at 24, cols. 3-4. Such legislation would decrease the
number of suits, but the problem of finding the most efficient method for resolving the
threshold issue would remain, although it would be less pressing.
171 Snyder v. Laffer, 81 Misc. 2d 814, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. CL Nassau County 1975).
17 No-fault insurance has yet to achieve its predicted objective of decreasing court cases
by 75% to 80%. A 20% to 30% decrease, however, has been accomplished. N.Y. Times, April
18, 1976, at 24, col. 3. Clearly, inflated medical costs have contributed to this failure. See note
170 supra.

173 Schwartz, supra note 146, at 57; see Sullivan v. Darling, 81 Misc. 2d 817, 820, 367
N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1975). See also N.Y. INS. LAw § 677 (McKinney

Supp. 1975). But see Comment, New York Adopts No-Fault:A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALBANY

L. REV. 662, 671 (1973), wherein the student author contends no-fault insurance will merely
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resolution of the threshold issue seems a far more preferable solution than postponement until full trial.
Pleas for legislative' 7 4 and judicial 7 5 action to develop no-fault
procedure have been made. Regardless of the solution finally
adopted - disposition by motion, postponement, or perhaps a
procedural system peculiar to no-fault - it is suggested that Cole
illustrates the potential for procedural frustration of no-fault insurance objectives and the need for clarification of no-fault procedure.
JUDICIARY LAW

JudiciaryLaw art. 19: Postjudgment enforcement procedures held violative
of due process.
Article nineteen of the New York Judiciary Law 76 established
postjudgment procedures whereby a judgment debtor could be
77
held in civil contempt, fined, and imprisoned without a hearing.
A debtor who failed to comply with a judgment creditor's subpoena
to appear for deposition concerning his ability to satisfy the judgment1 78 could be subject to an ex parte order of the court to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt. 1 79 Failure to appear
in response to this order could result in a determination that the
debtor was in contempt of court,1 8 0 whereupon a final order could
issue directing that he be fined and/or imprisoned. 8 ' If a fine had
been imposed and affidavits of the attorney for the judgment
creditor satisfied the court that the order imposing the fine had
been served on the judgment debtor and that he had failed to
comply therewith, the court could issue an ex parte commitment
provide moderate savings and that this feature was not stressed as a major benefit of the
statute.
"'See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 8, 11 (Supp. 1975).
175 Schwartz, supra note 146, at 58.
176 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 750 et seq. (McKinney 1975).
177
d. §§ 756, 757, 770, 772-74.
178 CPLR 5223 permits a judgment creditor to compel disclosure of any information
pertinent to the satisfaction of the judgment by serving the debtor with a subpoena. The
judgment creditor may serve any or all of the following subpoenas: a subpoena requiring the
debtor's attendance for deposition; a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of
books and papers; an information subpoena accompanied by written questions which require the debtor's written answers under oath. CPLR 5224.
1' CPLR 5251 makes "refusal or willful neglect' to obey a subpoena punishable as a
contempt of court. If the court was satisfied by creditor's affidavit that the judgment debtor
had failed to comply with the subpoena, it could issue an order directing the accused to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 757(1) (McKinney 1975). For a more detailed discussion of this procedure see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5251,
commentary at 199 (Supp. 1975).
18' N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 750(A)(3) (McKinney 1975).
181Id. §§ 770, 772.

